Saturday, February 18, 2017

No Silver Bullets - Enhancing Land Logistic Forces

The logistic implications of Multi Domain Battle might be a du jour topic, but it is a distraction for a small Army. The challenges envisaged by Multi Domain Battle are not unique and will feature in any operation conducted by the ADF. Persistent, pervasive surveillance and continuous exposure to fires from air, land, the electromagnetic spectrum and sea have long fuelled discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of dispersion and concentration. Unfortunately, the character of the next war is uncertain and therefore land forces cannot decide to concentrate or disperse preemptively. As Dave Beaumont rightly points out in  his blog Logistics in War; "it depends".

Flexibility remains the best way to counter this uncertainty (Palazzo, A Primer on Land Power). The exam question for Army is how to enhance logistic forces so that they best contribute to tactical, operational and strategic flexibility. Army could consider the following to do this:

Guarantee logistic support for contingency forces.  Contingency forces shape and deter threats and buy time and manoeuvre space for follow on forces.   The contingency forces of the ADF will become increasingly joint and land forces will become increasingly amphibious as a result of the practice of the amphibious capability. Unfortunately, logistic reviews of the past five years have avoided analysis of the CSS required to generate, deploy, employ and sustain the land component of the amphibious force. 

Increase the Overlap between Combat and Combat Service Support Soldiers. Combat and Combat Service Support soldiers must provide redundancy for each other. First and second line units should include soldiers with a mix of technical and tactical skills. For example: a medic should possess tactical questioning skills, some AFV driver should have vehicle mechanic skills or a truck driver should have the skills to operate heavy weapons. Army owns the training policy to allow this to be done efficiently. This will increase the self sufficiency of combat units and increase the survivability of logistic units. 

Educate leaders with regard to expeditionary logistics and mobilisation.  Army should champion an annual joint expeditionary logistics education activity; this could be a wargame, a symposium or a sustainment walk.

Create and maintain Logistic Expertise. Approximately 37% of Army field units are combat units, 37% are combat support units and the remaining 25% are combat service support units (yes I know I am missing a percent). Army's senior officer ranks, attendance on courses and exchanges should reflect these percentages. A review of Army's current weighting might reveal some opportunities for change. In turn, the logistic community must develop more responsive tools to inform Army leaders regarding to the logistic implications of force structure and equipment changes. At present there are too many opinions and not enough data. 

Enhance Command and Control. Agility derives from common understanding enabled by communications. To improve the agility of logistics units Army must deliver the training and equipment for CSS elements to use and protect C2 networks. The culture of CSS units must foster a relentless curiosity with regard to the location and intentions of the enemy and friendly units. 

There are no silver bullets. Ready contingency forces, intellectual capacity and soldiers practiced in fighting and communicating remain reliable counters to uncertainty. 

Combined Arms Mil Skills Team - led by a RAAOC CPL and consisting of equal numbers of CSS and RAAC soldiers