1. Assuming that technology, terrain, training and beyond line of sight fires are vaguely equal; an AFV built strictly to destroy people and things will always defeat an AFV designed to conduct reconnaissance, transport things, self deploy between theatres of operation or repair things.
2. Given 1, the latter should avoid the former. Although, see 3.
3. AFV lethality is a complex algorithm. Weapons (cannons and missiles) + sensors + crew + turret speed + fire control system + mobility + into action time + reload time + crew + ergonomics + ammunition type.
4. Given 3, correlation of a "Stryker with a 30mm" with all wheeled AFV is simplistic.
5. War is a duel. An AFV with a balanced firepower/protection/mobility package and growth potential makes an enemy work harder for advantage. More of all of them with undue compromise of the others is always better.
Deterrence and Assurance
6. To what degree the 2 CR presence in Eastern Europe deters aggressors and reassures allies cannot be calculated. 21st century deterrence is a complex equation of domestic and regional politics, adversary threshold for military action and military capability. Force ratios are one component of this equation.
7. Given 6, operational mobility, ease of sustainment and endurance may be more important variables than lethality.
8. The Australian Army's Armour forces must be designed to adapt. Open minded humans and high quality vehicles with a balance of firepower, protection, mobility and growth potential will be the basis of this capacity.
9. The 30mm Stryker in Eastern Europe case study is a single data point and should not influence a 30 year capability.
So What? Details and context matter simultaneously. Comparisons between a Stryker with a 30mm for 2CR and future Australian tracked and wheeled AFV is a pears and mandarins, chicken and egg discussion.