The armoured forces of the United Kingdom cluster around the Salisbury plain where the terrain is polite and observation is unfettered. This terrain is not a perfect facsimile of Western Europe but it is not markedly different either. Salisbury plain is only 150 kilometres from France. Berlin, in the far east of Germany, is only 850 kilometres from the English channel. By comparison, in 1941 - 43, the Wehrmacht fought twice that that distance Eastward to barely make the border of what is now Russia. But even this vast campaign could be comfortably accommodated south of Brisbane. In contrast to the Australian Army’s potential operating environment, Western Europe is a small area of open terrain well served by potential lines of communication.
These characteristics shape the way the NATO land forces think about warfare. In the late 1970’s General Dupuy designed the US Army and procured the “big five “- Abrams, Apache, Blackhawk, Paladin and Bradley to fight in Western European defensive operations. The operational concepts of his time and later General Starry’s, Elastic Defense and Air Land Battle, have been aped in all Western armies to some degree. Further, the limitations and advantages of the principal equipment and copies of them, can result in inadvertent alignment with the US model. This statement doesn’t devalue the alliances between Australia and other nations; it suggests that we should think carefully about the design of the Army relative to its primary operating environment.
This caution is required because the NATO model of fighting has long assumed that:
- Air attack is likely to be very effective because of short transit times and open terrain that increase the destructive value of any mission.
- Successful long range direct fire engagements are common.
- Because Western Europe is small and defensive operations often use interior lines, logistic challenges are typically less than those of expeditionary operations in large, undeveloped theatres of operation.
- Much of the terrain is trafficable by tracked vehicles.
Accepting these assumptions may have undesirable consequences for a small Army on an Island in the Pacific. Unfortunately, normal human interest in the massively powerful, heroic or spectacular collude to leave Australian Armour officers particularly vulnerable to Western European infatuations. The elements of this infatuation are a view that Armoured Fighting Vehicle versus Armoured Fighting Vehicle combat is the acme of the profession, a fascination with massing armour to the exclusion of other tactical approaches and a reduced appreciation of the value of dismounted operations. The Royal Australia Armoured Corps should institute a study of armour operations outside Western Europe and Iraq to avoid this bias.
Three obvious contenders for further study are; North Vietnamese Armour operations in 1972, South African Armour in the Border Wars in the late 1980’s and Australian Armour in Papua New Guinea in the Second World War.
North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese Armour - 1972
Armour played an important role in North Vietnamese operations at An Loc in the Central Highlands in 1972. This operation was preceded by a prolonged and difficult deployment. The 38 T54 of 20th Armour Battalion travelled 1200 kilometres along the Ho Chi Minh trail in two months, suffered 30 air attacks without losing a vehicle, and carried 800 kilograms of fuel and parts per vehicle. The appearance of the tanks created tactical surprise and gave the North Vietnamese Army the initiative in the days prior to the siege of An Loc.
The final North Vietnamese operation to capture An Loc was carefully constructed to offset the advantages of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. Mobile air defence systems ringed the city to protect North Vietnamese armour from helicopters and low flying fixed wing aircraft. On route 13, a motley North Vietnamese force of dug in infantry, obsolete captured AMX13 and M24 tanks, obstacles and mines interdicted South Vietnamese reinforcements. Despite the intelligent plan, An Loc did not fall. North Vietnamese units were defeated by a novel, or more likely desperate, combination of AVRN infantry and US Air Force strategic bombers. ARVN dismounted anti tank teams and obstacles took a toll on North Vietnamese armour units poorly synchronised with infantry and engineers in close terrain. North Vietnamese air defence systems, lethal to low flying aircraft, were powerless to stop high altitude B52 formations delivering hasty but overwhelming close air support.
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| North Vietnamese Mobile Air defence |
South African Defence Force (SADF) operations in Angola.
The South African Border wars began as a insurgency and civil war in Angola. In the early 1980's financial aid and military advisor support from the Soviet Union enhanced regular People's Armed Forces for Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) units. In 1986 these units, backed by Cuban expertise, weapons and soldiers, embarked on a major offensive to defeat the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) who were supported by South Africa. In response the SADF executed Operations Modular, Hooper and Packer to first halt, and then destroy FALPA forces.
To make contact with the FALPA an SADF Brigade deployed approximately 300 km from bases within South Africa. This long preliminary approach march reduced the capacity of the South African Air Force (SAAF) to remain on station and conduct close air support. As a result, the SADF Brigade relied heavily on tube and rocket artillery for close and deep fires. Whilst the SADF Brigade was equipped with Ratel Wheeled APC and a Squadron of tanks, sandy soil and low brush infestations restricted movement and increased vehicle failure rates. The brush also limited observation and most armoured vehicle engagements occurred at less than 200 metres. Standoff reconnaissance by air and radar yielded little actionable intelligence. South Africa units overcame these challenges through mission command and combat reconnaissance operations.
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| A SADF Olifant and RATEL 20 |
Australian Armour in Papua New Guinea
To capture Buna in Northern Papua New Guinea Australian and US Forces attacked on two fronts, Warren and Urbana. Despite a desire to execute combined arms operations, the first attempt to move tanks forward to the Warren front on 13 Nov 42 sunk both landing craft and tank. Instead of tanks, Bren gun carriers accompanied the initial infantry assaults. Determined Japanese defenders, unaffected by preliminary bombing and artillery fire, blunted these attacks and inflicted catastrophic casualties. All five Bren gun carriers were destroyed.
In early December 1942 the Australian 18th Brigade and eight Stuart tanks reinforced the Warren front. Tanks engaged bunkers at barrel length as crew commanders threw grenades from turrets. In turn, the tanks were destroyed by fires lit under them in the long grass, molotov cocktails and well concealed anti tank guns. As a result, historians remain divided as to the importance of the tanks to the ultimate success of the operation. This does not mean that Buna doesn't offer lessons to be learnt regarding tank/infantry/artillery cooperation and intra-theatre movement and sustainment. Buna isn’t an outlier. In the future the Australian Army will fight in the jungle, the enemy will dig in, and air power will be ineffective.
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| A Tank from 2/6 Armd Regt with Infantry at Buna |
An Loc, Angola and Buna are just three engagements of thousands that weren’t fought in Western Europe. Further study will illuminate tactics and capabilities that combined arms teams need to prevail in the Australian Army’s primary operating environment; focus unit professional development; and provide ready made vignettes for war games. Such study is the start point for the Royal Australian Armoured Corps to develop subject matter experts at fighting in terrain that is not ideal for armour but demands combined arms operations.